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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINES:  
RESTORATION, RECOGNITION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
 
 
Ibarra M. Gutierrez III1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The widespread recognition of human rights by the international community is 
perhaps one of the most significant historical developments of the last century. The 
adoption of the United Nations General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948, followed by the introduction and subsequent 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)2 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)3, were major 
steps towards achieving a broad, world-wide consensus on the fundamental freedoms and 
rights intrinsic to every human person. 
 
But even in the face of these developments in the international arena, legal 
recognition, support, and, perhaps most importantly, enforcement, of human rights within 
the jurisdiction of individual states remained largely inadequate, particularly when 
measured against the standards and objectives of the UDHR and the two covenants. Many 
years after the adoption of these instruments, allegations of human rights violations 
committed in various States continued to reported.4  
 
                                                           
1 Assistant Professor, University of the Philippines College of Law, and Director, UP Institute of Human 
Rights 
2 Entered into force on 23 March 1976 
3 Entered into force on 3 January 1976 
4 See Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993 
In the Philippines, during the presidency of Ferdinand E. Marcos, State-sanctioned 
violation of human rights was one of the most prominent issues raised against the 
government. It is alleged that some 70,000 people were arbitrarily thrown into jail, tortured, 
vanished without a trace ("disappeared"), or killed ("salvaged") in the fourteen years since 
President Marcos imposed military rule in 1972.5 
 
The horrifying extent of the human rights abuses perpetrated during the Marcos 
regime was perhaps most clearly established when, in 1992, 10,000 alleged victims of 
human rights violations won a class action suit in a Hawaii court against the estate of the 
former president.6 Alleging that during the course of his dictatorship President Marcos had 
directed and controlled torture, summary execution and disappearance in order to maintain 
himself in power and gain great wealth, the plaintiffs in this suit were awarded nearly $2 
billion in damages. This judgement was subsequently affirmed on appeal by the US 9th 
Circuit Federal Court.7 
 
Given the deplorable human rights record of the Philippine government during the 
Marcos years, it is perhaps not surprising that after the ouster of Marcos in February 1986, 
the issue of human rights was one of the principal issues the new administration attempted 
to address. In fact, many of the significant legal reforms relating to human rights, 
particularly those enshrined in the “post-Marcos” Constitution, which was ratified in 
February 1987, were adopted during the immediate aftermath of the popular revolt that 
toppled Marcos or what is now popularly known as the “People Power” Revolution. 
 
This chapter will discuss the various legal and institutional reforms relating to 
human rights which arose in response to and as a consequence of the experience under the 
Marcos regime and the popular uprising that ended that era.  
                                                           
5 TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES (TFDP), VIOLATIONS IN DETAIL (2001) 
6 The suit was brought under the provisions of the US Alien Tort Claims Act which gives US Federal Courts 
jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States." The class action suit alleged that former President Marcos was responsible for acts of 
torture, an international crime.  
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 I. Recognition and Reform 
 One of the earliest acts of the post-Marcos administration of President Corazon C. 
Aquino was to ratify two key international covenants on human rights – the CCPR, which 
the Philippines signed on 23 October 1986, and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
which the Philippines signed on 18 June 1986.8 Although both instruments had been passed 
years earlier, with the CCPR having taken effect fully a decade before, the Marcos 
government, perhaps understandably, had ratified neither. 
 
 This commitment to human rights, at least insofar as the ratification of international 
covenants was concerned, would continue throughout President Aquino’s term, and even to 
succeeding administrations.9 In fact, the Philippines is currently a signatory of virtually all 
major human rights covenants, with the notable exception of the Second Optional Protocol 
of the CCPR which calls for abolition capital punishment.10 
 
 But despite the indisputable significance of the Philippines’ ratification of these 
international human rights instruments, the most important legal development concerning 
human rights in the post-Marcos era would have to relate to the provisions of the 1987 
Constitution on human rights. 
 
 Drafted by a Constitutional Commission composed of persons directly appointed by 
President Aquino, the 1987 Constitution contains numerous “innovations” intended to 
uphold and safeguard the human rights of individual citizens. From an Article which set 
forth a “Bill of Rights,” 11  as was contained in the previous Constitution, the 1987 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767 (9th Circuit 1996) 
8 Record of Ratifications, UN Commission on Human Rights 
9 The Philippines ratified the First Optional Protocol to the CCPR on 22 August 1989, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) on 21 August 1990, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on 21 March 2001. 
10 Record of Ratifications, UN Commission on Human Rights 
11 CONST., ARTICLE III 
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Constitution went further by adding a completely new Article on “Social Justice and 
Human Rights.”12  
 
While the Bill of Rights established constitutional protection for the human rights 
traditionally designated as “civil and political” in nature, such as the freedom of speech and 
the rights of the accused, the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights imposed upon the 
State the obligation to uphold, protect and promote rights traditionally deemed to be 
“economic, social and cultural” in nature.13 Hence the Article discussed State obligations 
with respect to the rights of labor14, farmers and agrarian workers15, the urban poor16, 
women17, and other sectors. 
 
But perhaps more significantly, the same Article created a new body, an 
independent office to investigate human rights violations – the Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR).18 
 
II. Institutionalized Protection  
 The creation of the CHR under the 1987 Constitution, an independent office tasked 
“to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights” was 
a direct response to the prior experience of massive human rights violations during the 
Marcos era. As Commissioner Sarmiento stated in his sponsorship speech during the 
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission –  
 
My fellow Commissioners, the creation of a Human Rights Commission is a timely 
innovation in our Constitution. It has come at a time when the recognition of the 
need to protect and promote human rights is at its height. Fifteen years of abuses of 
                                                           
12 CONST., ARTICLE XIII 
13 Many authors assail the delineation as artificial and emphasize instead the interdependence of all human 
rights. See A. EIDE AND A. ROSAS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 15 (1995) 
14 CONST., ARTICLE XIII, SEC. 3 
15 CONST., ARTICLE XIII, SECS. 4-6 
16 CONST., ARTICLE XIII, SECS. 9-10  
17 CONST., ARTICLE XIII, SEC. 14 
18 CONST., ARTICLE XIII, SECS. 17-19 
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fundamental rights and freedoms have awakened us to the need for a comprehensive 
program for the promotion, protection and respect for human rights. Such a program 
can best be formulated and undertaken by a specialized agency which is independent 
from the three main branches of government and equipped with the necessary 
powers and functions to carry out its programs.19 
 This sentiment was echoed in the remarks of Commissioner Nolledo who declared 
that –  
Madam President, for many years during the Marcos regime, human rights were 
abundantly violated. Even in the present regime, we still have these violations. 
Commissioners Rodrigo, Rama and I were victims of the violations of human rights 
when, without previous charges, we were sent to jail. The concern for the protection 
of human rights is worldwide as indicated by Commissioner Rama. The provisions 
on the constitutional authority known as the Human Rights Commission underscore 
the need to strengthen a mechanism that will truly protect human rights and 
vindicate victims of violations thereof.20 
 
To curtail the possibility of further abuses by the government – similar to what 
happened during the Marcos regime – investigation of human rights violations was made 
the principal task of the CHR. It was, however, not limited to this role. Under Section 18 of 
Article XIII, the CHR was further mandated to “provide for preventive measures and legal 
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need 
protection,”21 to “[r]ecommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights 
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights,” 22  and to 
“[m]onitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on 
human rights.”23 All of these were intended to prevent the massive human rights violations 
in the past from recurring. 
 
But beyond the issue of human rights protection, the CHR was also assigned to 
undertake efforts at human rights promotion through education and information 
                                                           
19 See Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 
20 Ibid. 
21 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 3 
22 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 6 
23 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 7 
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campaigns.24  As Commissioner Garcia explained in his sponsorship speech of this Section 
–  
I think an outstanding feature of this probable Commission on Human Rights is the 
fact that it will help establish a program of education and information to propagate 
human rights. In other words, we envision the prevention of human rights violations 
in the future where we have a citizenry that is convinced that it must uphold its basic 
rights; that it must defend its basic rights because it knows what its rights are, in the 
first place. Also, for those who must uphold the law, they will be educated in a 
sense; for example, regarding the treatment of prisoners and detainees and the 
proper procedures according to the due process of law. So this responsibility that 
will be given to the Human Rights Commission will, in a way, resolve and prevent, 
rather than cure what is unjust after it has been committed. Secondly, I believe it is 
also a very important fact that because we have now won our basic rights as a 
people, we must also, in a sense, realize that there are many other peoples in other 
parts of the world who have not yet won their rights. One of the other areas of 
education is precisely to show the different forms and ways of how the human rights 
of other peoples are violated in other parts of the world. And we can also have a 
people who will be conscious of these violations and perhaps contribute to the 
protection of human rights wherever they are violated, because human rights have 
no color, no creed, no nationality and no boundaries.25 
 
 
 In the performance of its functions, the CHR was granted authority adopt its own 
rules of procedure and to cite persons in contempt for violations thereof.26 It was likewise 
vested with visitorial powers over jails27, and given the capacity to request assistance in its 
functions from any department, bureau, agency or office in government.28 
 
 With the creation of the CHR, the Constitutional Commission hoped that it had an 
institution ready and able to face the challenge of promoting and protecting human rights in 
the post-Marcos era. More importantly, they had instituted a mechanism for fostering 
human rights consciousness both within government and in society. As Commissioner Ople 
stated while explaining his vote affirming the creation of the CHR –  
                                                           
24 ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 5 provides that the CHR shall “Establish a continuing program of research, 
education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights.”  
25 See Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 
26 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 2 
27 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 4 
28 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 17 PAR. 9 
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I think this is a historic milestone in the entire history of the struggle for civil 
liberties and human rights in our country. Some of us had initial reservations about 
setting up a constitutional body that would act with reasonable independence of the 
government itself in the pursuit of the crusade for human rights, but I think a 
consensus grew that nothing short of a constitutional sanction and mandate would 
be required in order to make human rights or the concern for human rights second 
nature to our countrymen.29 
  
III. The Limits of Hope 
 It would be difficult to dispute that the creation of the CHR – an independent body 
tasked to protect and promote human rights and sanctioned by the organic law itself – was, 
and is, a worthy achievement, a milestone in the development of human rights advocacy in 
the Philippines. Its very existence is testament to the gains of the democratic struggle in the 
Philippines, and a clear indicator of the progress Philippine legal institutions have achieved 
since the fall of the Marcos regime. 
 
 But despite this, it is similarly difficult to dispute that the CHR has, as of yet, failed 
to live up fully to the grand expectations and bright hopes that heralded its birth as an 
institution. 
 
 Part of this failure can perhaps be attributed to the diminution in the scope of the 
CHR’s authority brought about by a series of Supreme Court decisions which dealt with the 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions creating the CHR.  
 
The first of these judicial declarations was the case of Cariño v. Commission on 
Human Rights30 This case involved a complaint filed by striking public school teachers 
before the CHR, wherein they alleged that they had been engaged in peaceful mass actions 
when they were suddenly and without notice or explanation replaced as teachers. The 
respondent in the CHR case, Education Secretary Isidro Cariño, sought to have the 
                                                           
29 See Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 
30 G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 
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complaint dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CHR declined to dismiss 
and the case was brought before the high court. 
 
In its decision, the Court declared that –  
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the 
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or 
even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the 
power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like 
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court 
declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was 
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in 
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.31 
 
 The Court went on to rule that the CHR had only investigative powers. It could not 
adjudicate cases involving human rights violations. It then concluded by ordering the 
dismissal of the complaint against Secretary Cariño. 
 
 The 1992 decision in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human 
Rights32 continued the trend in limiting the authority of the CHR. In this case, the issue 
presented before the Court was whether the CHR had the power to issue injunctive writs 
and temporary restraining orders under the grant of authority in Article XIII, Section 17 of 
the Constitution. Ruling in the negative, the Supreme Court declared –  
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to “provide for preventive measures 
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated 
or need protection” may not be construed to confer jurisdiction in the Commission 
to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the 
Constitution would have expressly said so. “Jurisdiction is conferred only by the 
Constitution or by law” (Oroso, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 
January 1991; Bacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 
519). It is never derived by implication. (Garcia, et al v. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 
88158; Tobon Uy v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 97108-09, 4 March 
1992)33 
 
                                                           
31 Ibid. at 491 
32 G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125 
33 Ibid. at 131 
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 With the rulings in these two cases, the CHR had been effectively denied both 
adjudicatory functions and the authority to issue restraining orders. It had been confined to 
resorting to the standard judicial process in order to carry out its mandate. 
 
 The third, and perhaps the crippling, judicial blow came in 1994 in the case of 
Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights.34 This case arose after the local government of 
Quezon City served an eviction notice to a group of small-scale entrepreneurs from an area 
along North Edsa, Quezon City, to give way to the establishment of a “People’s Park.” In 
response to the eviction notice, the vendors’ association filed a complaint before the CHR 
alleging violation of their “business rights.” The CHR subsequently issued a “cease and 
desist” order against the local government. When the demolition of stalls nonetheless 
proceeded, the CHR cited the city government in contempt, thus prompting it to file a 
petition before the Supreme Court. 
 
 In its ruling, the high court reiterated its prior judgement in Cariño, which held the 
CHR to be without any adjudicatory function or authority. But it went further by declaring 
that insofar as the investigatory functions of the CHR were concerned, it could only 
exercise the same in cases involving violations of civil and political rights. According to the 
Court –  
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is 
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that 
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. 
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights 
of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) 
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and 
(6) other crimes committed against the religious.” While the enumeration has not 
likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a 
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any 
event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a 
conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigative jurisdiction. They have 
thus seen fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of 
                                                           
34 G.R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994, 229 SCRA 117 
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violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, 
taking into account its recommendation.”35 
 The Court continued by declaring that –  
... looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances 
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the 
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents 
can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and 
political rights” intended by the Constitution.36 
 
 Thus with this case, even the investigative authority of the CHR was limited to only 
violations of civil and political rights.37 While the Court did point out that Congress could 
expand the scope of the CHR’s investigative authority, at present it has not chosen to do so. 
In fact, outside of Article XIII, the only other government issuance that concerns itself with 
the authority of the CHR is Executive Order No. 163 issued by President Aquino38 which 
merely implemented the same constitutional provision.     
 
  But despite the limitation on the CHR to confine itself only to “human rights 
violations involving civil and political rights”, nonetheless “economic, social and cultural” 
rights have still found a place in the post-Marcos constitutional order. As previously 
mentioned, the same Article on Social Justice and Human Rights which created the CHR, 
also provided recognition for economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
IV. Broader Guarantees 
 In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution, State 
commitment to “[value] the dignity of every human person and [guarantee] full respect for 
human rights” is expressly and unequivocally declared.39 This provision is concretized 
principally through the Bill of Rights40 and the newly introduced Article XIII, which deals 
with Social Justice and Human Rights. 
                                                           
35 Ibid. at 133. The provision quoted by the Court is Art. XIII, Sec. 19 
36 Ibid. at 134 
37 But see footnote 13 
38 Dated 5 May 1987 
39 CONST., ART. II, SEC. 11 
40 CONST., ART. III 
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 This commitment to recognize and promote human rights can be further discerned 
in Sections 9 and 10 of Article II, which deal with the promotion of a “just and dynamic 
social order” and  “social justice in all phases of national development.” In contrast to the 
two earlier constitutions of 1935 and 1973, the present Constitution does not simply impose 
upon the State the duty to address economic inequities but the full range of socio-economic, 
political, and cultural inequalities, “in all phases of national development.” 41  This 
broadening of emphasis also provides an explanation for the introduction of the entirely 
separate Article on Social Justice and Human Rights. 
 
 In fact, Article XIII begins with a declaration that “Congress shall give highest 
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to 
human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural 
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.”42 This 
indicates the clear intent to give constitutional recognition to “economic, social and 
cultural” rights side by side with the recognition already firmly extended to “civil and 
political” rights in Article III. 
 
 Thus the “human rights” the State is mandated to guarantee under the 1987 
Constitution appears to include all types of rights – whether civil, political, economic, 
social, or cultural. 
 
V. Defending the Marginalized 
 One major significance of Article XIII is its imposition of obligations to the State 
for the benefit of specific sectors, such as labor, farmers, and the urban poor. The Marcos 
era saw more than its fair share of abuses perpetrated against this marginalized, and hence 
vulnerable, social groups, and, perhaps more significantly, much of the social unrest during 
those years arose out of the economic difficulties experienced by these sectors. Hence these 
new guarantees. 
                                                           
41 BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 73 (1988) 
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  Section 4, for instance, addresses the question of land ownership and distribution  – 
a problem of long-standing that lay at the heart of nearly a century of peasant revolts. In an 
effort to remedy this dilemma, this provision mandates the implementation of an agrarian 
reform program to allow farmers to “own the land” they till or in the case of farmworkers 
“to receive a just share” in the fruits of the land.43 
 
 This provision, in turn, was implemented through the enactment of The 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)44 Soon after the law’s passage, its validity 
was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Association of Small Landowners v. 
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.45 The high court upheld the law, and had occasion to explain 
that the process of land reform mandated in the law was an exercise of both police power 
and eminent domain. 
 
 Agricultural lands, however, were not the only lands made subject to reform under 
the 1987 Constitution. Natural resources, including lands of the public domain, were made 
subject to the “principles of agrarian reform,” 46  as were urban lands. 47  This was a 
significant expansion of the concept of land reform as embodied in the previous, Marcos 
era constitution.48 
 
 Urban land reform, in particular, was a new constitutional concept.  Although 
during the Marcos years, a decree “declaring” urban land reform had in fact been enacted, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
42 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 1 
43 ART. XIII, SEC. 4  The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of 
farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the 
case of other farm workers, to receive a just share in the fruits thereof. To this end the State shall encourage 
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention 
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, 
and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits the State shall respect the 
rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. 
44 Republic Act No. 6657 
45 G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343 
46 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 6 
47 CONST., ART. XIII, SEC. 9 
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the truth of the matter was it merely granted legitimate tenants who had resided 10 years or 
more in designated “urban land reform zones” a right of first refusal to purchase the lands 
they occupied. 49 In contrast, urban land reform as established in the 1987 Constitution had 
a broader concept. As explained by Commissioner Foz during the deliberations, its purpose 
was –  
First, to liberate human communities from blight, congestions, and hazards and to 
promote their development and modernization; second, to bring about the optimum 
use of land as a national resource for the public welfare rather than as a community 
[sic] of trade subject to price speculation and indiscriminate use; third, to provide 
equitable access to and opportunity for the use and enjoyment of the fruits of the 
land; fourth, to acquire such lands as are necessary to prevent speculative buying of 
land for public welfare; and finally, to maintain and support a vigorous private 
enterprise system responsive to community requirements in the use and 
development of urban lands.50 
 
 
 Section 9, which dealt with urban land reform, was the first of two provisions that 
sought to safeguard the rights of the rapidly increasing urban poor population in the 
Philippines. The second, Section 10, dealt more specifically with the right of “urban and 
rural poor dwellers” to be evicted only in accordance with law and in a just and humane 
manner.51 These provisions were enacted partly in response to the violent evictions and 
demolitions that took place during the Marcos regime. The intent, clearly, was to afford 
sufficient protection to the urban poor and, in doing so, prevent the massive violations of 
human rights that were committed under the past administration. In the eloquent words of 
Commissioner Brocka –  
This particular section [Sec 10] is premised on the fact that squatters, whether they 
are illegal or not, whether they are professionals or not, are human beings. It is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
48 BERNAS at 1066 
49 Presidential Decree No. 1517 enacted in 1978 
50 See Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 
51 ART. 9  The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, 
a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent 
housing and basic services to the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement 
areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such 
program the State shall respect the rights of  small property owners.  
 ART. 10  Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in 
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. 
 13
their fault that they are poor. Under the law, they should be protected. That 
particular protection is what we are asking under this section on social justice.52 
  
Both these sections were implemented through the passage of the Urban 
Development and Housing Act (UDHA) 53  in 1992.  The UDHA mandated local 
governments, in coordination with several national housing agencies, to pursue a 
comprehensive program for housing for “underprivileged and homeless citizens.”  In 
addition, it prescribed strict requirements for evictions involving the same group.54 
 
  Like the CARL before it, the validity of the UDHA was challenged before the 
Supreme Court, this time in the case of Macasiano v. National Housing Authority 55 
                                                           
52 See Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 
53 Republic Act No. 7279 
54 Sec. 28 Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be 
allowed under the following situations: 
a)  When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, 
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. 
b)  When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or 
c)  When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. 
 
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the 
following shall be mandatory: 
1)  Notice upon the affected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or 
demolition; 
2)  Adequate consultations on the matter of resettlement with the duly designated representatives of the 
families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated; 
3)  Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition; 
4)  Proper identification of persons taking part in the demolition; 
5)  Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during 
good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise; 
6)  No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete 
materials; 
7)  Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law 
enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and 
8)   Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent; Provided, however, that in cases of eviction and 
demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be 
undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the 
assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final 
judgement by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed; Provided, further, that should 
relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the 
prevailing minimum wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the 
local government unit concerned.  
55 224 SCRA 236 (1993) 
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However, the high court in this instance refused to rule squarely on the issue, and instead 
dismissed the case on the ground of lack of standing of the petitioner. 
 
 Borne from the bitter experience of the Marcos martial law years, numerous 
provisions aiming to safeguard and to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
particularly of the most vulnerable sectors in society, have been made part of the 1987 
Constitution. Addressing both civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights, these provisions represent a broader recognition, and extend a greater degree of 
protection than that found in the previous legal regime. 
 
Conclusion 
 The popular democratic uprising that finally put an end to the tyranny of the Marcos 
regime brought about many changes in the Philippine constitution and legal system. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, most of these changes were prompted by the oftentimes dire 
experiences under martial rule. 
 
 Human rights, which were unfortunately characterized more by their violation than 
either their protection or recognition during the Marcos Era, was one field in which many 
developments took place after the revolt.  
 
 From the creation of an independent Commission of Human Rights, to the formal, 
constitutional recognition of a wider range of human rights, the post-Marcos era has seen 
tremendous progress towards a fuller and firmer institutionalization of human rights in the 
Philippine legal system.    
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